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 Abstract  
IT-based networking trends such as the rise of social media, crowd sourcing, open innovation, and 
cloud computing enable a profoundly different way of working and collaborating that challenges 
significantly traditional approaches of companies towards governance, i.e. the mechanisms a 
company employs to achieving business results and safeguarding information. Standard practices 
developed with a hierarchical model of the company in mind, are inadequate for providing sufficient 
correlation between governance mechanisms deployed and results achieved.  
Popular literature on the subject states that dealing effectively with such new technologies in a 
business environment requires relinquishing control and subverting to trust. This paper makes the 
case that deploying successfully new IT-based networking tools rather involves shifting one’s trust 
from a well-established and well-known governance system based on hierarchy and control towards 
another governance system, termed in the literature as network governance. This paper assesses 
when network governance is the better suited governance system. The presented theoretical model 
helps to understand how companies should use arising new technologies and which tasks are suited 
for network-driven IT-applications. Furthermore, the model enables to understand how network 
governance works to achieve business results and to safeguard information exchanges.  
Key words: Entrepreneurship, Innovation, Network-IT, IT Governance, Information technology, 
Network governance theory.  
1. Introduction  
Current governance practices are questioned by arising new international networks driven by 
changing institutional conditions such as the application of new IT technologies. A global economy is 
arising in which new technologies change sector conditions. IT technologies make it easier for a 
company to enter new markets, which may imply that foreign competitors can enter your market 
virtually overnight. These developments, leading to global competition in many markets, do affect 
big as well as small and medium sized companies alike. Companies need to be aware, therefore, 
what the potential opportunities and threats are of these developments.  
In this paper, we study how governance can be used to deal with the consequences of these 
developments, thus investigating how network IT (for example social media), IT solutions can be 
deployed to allow inter-organizational collaboration Information and communication technology is 
changing the way IT is used and managed within a company. For example, companies outsource 
activities to companies on other continents or buy IT services abroad. Or employees are interacting 
with experts in different time zones to solve an acute problem in their work.. Within the ‘new’ 
economy coordination mechanisms need to be redefined and hybrid governance mechanism seem to 
appear (Elsner (2004).  
In this paper we combine current theory on network governance (Jones et. al. 1997), with new 
insights within inter-organizational cooperation within IT-governance (Ibrahim & Ribbers 2009). The 
combined theory provides insights in what types of tasks are suitable for a networked collaboration 
approach, and what type of mechanisms allow networked collaborations to be effective. To frame it 
in popular terms: When do social media offer opportunities to organisations and how should these 
kind of opportunities be governed? We do not use the word management here, because it suggests a 
hierarchical relationship. The lack of (formal) hierarchy appears to be a characteristic of the use of 
network IT, inter-organizational cooperation and network governance.  
Governance indicates a set of – formal or informal – processes and decision rights that together 
support accountability (Jones et. al. 1997, De Graaf & Herkströter 2007). The assessment of the 
relevance of IT solutions to the companies’ success and how the pertinent IT solutions are organized 
and implemented are governance questions. Within this governance perspective, we assume that the 
board will try to create new fruitful interdependencies, without becoming solely dependent of forces 
they do not know nor understand and do not control. They should be able to assess:  
• when network IT offers a preferable approach to achieving business objectives,  
• when and how employees of the company should be allowed to communicate and build 
networks with the outside world freely,  
• when IT systems and business processes can or should be performed in collaboration with 
outside entities, and  
• how these activities can be expected to achieve business results and how information flow 
will be safeguarded.  
This paper focuses on the third and fourth of these questions: When and how should network IT (for 
example social media) be used by organisations? Within our perspective, following Jones et al. 
(1999), we define network governance as “a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous 
entities (individuals or companies, as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in creating products or 
services based on implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to 
coordinate and safeguard exchanges” (Jones et. al., pp. 914).   
Our paper is structured as follows. Below, in section 2, we will elaborate on the emerging 
developments within current economies, often coined as the network economy. Thereafter [section 
3], we will elaborate on developments within corporate governance, in particular on network 
governance. These developments have preceded the emergence of the network economy, but offer 
useful tools for understanding and governing inter-organizational cooperation. We highlight the 
differences between a traditional governance perspective and theoretical perspectives on network 
governance, mainly based on (Jones et. al. 1997, Ibrahim & Ribbers 2009).  
Within the fourth section, we come back to the question when an inter-organizational approach is 
preferable and when network governance becomes the better perspective. In the fifth section, we 
provide a better understanding of how network governance works to achieve business results and to 
safeguard information and how management could use network governance to maximize benefits.  
 
2. The Network Economy  
The term “network economy” is generally meant to denote the business environment that has 
emerged as a result from ubiquitous information technology allowing access to information anytime 
and anywhere, irrespective of time and location. Some descriptions of this kind of environment have 
been described in a number of popular books, including those by Kelly (1998), Malone et al. (1998), 
Chesbrough et al. (2006), Fingar (2006) and Tapscott and Williams (2006).  
With the advent of social media, individuals play increasingly independent roles in the network 
economy. This also implies that employees have active relationships and communications with 
others within as well as outside the company. This can lead to undesired situations, such as 
employees reacting directly to aggravated customers complaining on the internet or employees 
developing new product ideas with people outside the company. However, social media can also be 
powerful tools for knowledge management and relations management.  
The governance of issues related directly to the use of social media is outside the scope of this paper. 
We concentrate rather on inter-organizational cooperation. In academia, the term inter-
organizational cooperation is most used to discuss critical cooperation between companies 
(Nooteboom 2000, 2004). Within this literature, the division between companies is not strictly 
defined and relationships are more than contracts between a buyer and a supplier.  
Traditionally, the different business functions within a company were located close to where the 
business dictated, e.g., close to prospective customers, resources, or the decision making unit of the 
company. The emergence of information technology and the global spread of access to the internet 
have allowed much more unconstrained location of business functions and of the individuals 
contributing to those functions, and ultimately the delegation of responsibilities for certain business 
functions to other organisations (outsourcing) and/or collections of more or less unorganised 
individuals (crowd sourcing).  
• Outsourcing: This is a fairly common practice, where – typically non-critical – business 
functions are handed over to an outside party. One of the advantages of outsourcing is that it 
allows a company to focus on its key business processes. One example of an industry branch 
that has made extensive use of outsourcing is the automobile industry, where the production 
of many of the components of cars has been outsourced to different companies. Deciding 
which business processes are key and which are not has led in extreme cases to companies 
that focus themselves on  
only one business process, e.g. Nike which is essentially a – albeit very successful – marketing & sales 
organisation.  
• Crowd sourcing: An interesting phenomenon is the creation of products via the contribution of 
many – often unpaid – professionals. Examples are the operating system Linux and the 
internet encyclopaedia Wikipedia. In these examples, a task is outsourced to a – often 
unspecified – group of individuals, i.e. the crowd, who then each contribute according to his or 
her interests and abilities.  
 
This paper focuses on situations where a business performs part of its business endeavours via a 
temporary collaboration with other businesses and/or individuals. The decision to perform a business 
task via a temporary collaboration in itself may not always be made explicitly according to traditional 
governance rules. The absence of guidance means that employees may enter informal collaborations 
outside of proper channels, simply because the “proper channels” have not been defined. In this 
paper, we discuss governance in view of the network economy from the perspective of one business, 
i.e. the primary business that ultimately makes the sourcing decision. In doing this, we build further 
on earlier work of McAfee (2010), which stresses the critical role of Network IT with these types of 
collaboration. Besides network IT, he defines functional IT and enterprise IT.  
The network economy signifies a philosophy of innovation and entrepreneurship where multiple 
parties contribute according to their specific strengths. Although cost reduction is a typical primary 
objective of sourcing, other benefits derive from allocating functions to other parties according to 
respective strengths, such as quality and innovative strength. The latter provided one allows outside 
parties to become contributors to innovation processes. This opening up of innovation processes to 
outside parties is also termed “open innovation”, see for example the work of Chesbrough (2003).  
The basic underlying assumption in “open innovation” is that there is more creative and innovative 
talent outside a company than inside. This talent can be tapped by making the innovation platform of 
a business transparent. By combining outside ideas – including those of customers – with inside 
business models and development platforms, a business should be able to improve upon its 
innovative power. A current example are the IPhone Apps, where Apple has invited the general 
public to develop new applications for its IPhone and IPad products, resulting in literally hundreds of 
thousands of new applications developed by outsiders, but sold through Apple’s distribution 
channels. Key differences between open and more traditional “closed” innovation are given in Table 
1.  
 
Table 1. Differences between Closed and Open Innovation 
Closed innovation  Open innovation  
All relevant smart people work for the 
company  
There are more smart people outside than 
inside the company  
The company only profits from R&D when the 
company explores, invents and develops in 
house  
The company profits from other’s R&D. 
provided sufficient  
If the company invents something themselves, 
they will be first to market  
A company can profit from the inventions of 
others outside the company  
Whoever communicates an invention first, is 
the winner  
A good business model is more important 
than being first to market  
Those who have the most and brightest new 
ideas, wins  
Those who make the best use of anybody’s 
new ideas, wins  
A company has to protect intellectual 
property to prevent others from benefiting  
A company benefits from others using their 
intellectual property and a company should be 




These examples have in common that business results, specifically innovation, are achieved by 
collaboration between temporarily and loosely coupled entities (other businesses and professional 
workers). The question that arises is: how does a business manage its ongoing business and 
innovation while adopting ways of working from the network economy and how does a business 
benefit from the network economy?  
Developments that are allowing businesses to allocate business functions to more suitable outside 
functions also are also responsible for a considerable change in the relationship between a company 
and its employees. Since the industrial revolution in Western economies, the role of businesses as 
primary providers of employment has been growing. Businesses had become by the end of the 
twentieth century relatively stable organisations with employees set on life-long employment. But 
the last decade, the number of self-employed professionals has been growing again (Van den Born, 
2009). While – on the one hand – companies want to be flexible in hiring and firing employees as 
ever faster market developments dictate, professionals – on the other hand – are becoming more 
aware of their value and are increasingly seeking interesting projects irrespective of the company 
commissioning the project. As a consequence IT governance has to accommodate for an increasingly 
fleeting relationship between a business and the professionals it employs to pursue its business 
endeavours.  
 
3. Network governance and application to inter-organizational cooperation and IT  
When we assess corporate governance literature, governance is about the conflict of interest 
between various groups that are involved within a company. In 1932, Berle & Means discussed the 
development of the modern firm in the United States. These big companies where owned by a large 
group of shareholders, but controlled by managers that had an own interest. Between shareholders 
(principals) and managers (agents) a critical conflict of interest existed, as Berle and Means claimed. 
Governance mechanisms should enable to create an optimal balance between the shareholder and 
the manager. Distrust, control, contracts and the need for transparency which would enable 
shareholders to make the management accountable – are key elements in this perspective. This so-
called agency theory is still guiding governments, managers and shareholders all over the world (De 
Graaf & Williams, 2009).  
New societal and technological developments have led to the arisen of network governance. Within 
this perspective, not the conflict of interest between principals and agents is central, but companies 
operate in networks which enables them to create ‘products or services based on implicit and open-
ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard 
exchanges” (Jones et al., p. 914).  
Network governance seems to make the world more complicated than described by Berle & Means. 
Critical distinctions in business, for example between the inside and the outside of the company, 
seem to disappear. For example, within corporate governance theory, a distinction is made between 
internal governance, how the various parts of the company are structured and where decisions are 
made, and the external governance, how the company is dealing with stakeholders, for example 
shareholders and the government (Gillan, 1998).  
A new theoretical starting point seems to develop, as displayed in Table 2. Where traditional 
corporate governance focuses on tensions within a one-to-one relationship, network governance is 
all about groups and peers. Under external pressure, organizations are “forced”  
to a different governance strategy in which not the conflict of interest between the agent and 
principal is critical, but they have to “wheel and deal” with a network of actors, for example 
companies. Besides contracts, the concept of ‘reputation’ becomes a critical determinant for control 
on markets that are not stable and transparent, but instable and rapidly developing. Within exchange 
relations, the contributions of specific individuals have become critical which are not merely bound 
with contracts, but with personal commitment: only a particular specialist can do the job.  
    
These arising new conditions are not relevant for all tasks and operations (Jones et al., 1997). Many 
can be standardised within contracts. Within innovation and complex processes, distributed among 
multiple collaborating parties, new governance conditions arise. The remainder of this paper will 
focus on when network governance is needed and how this would look like.  
 
4. Network governance and inter-organizational IT  
IT is pervasive in most companies, although in different roles and in varying degrees of requiring IT 
governance for their the company’s health. McAfee offers a useful categorization of IT being used 
within companies (McAfee, 2010). McAfee distinguishes Function IT, Network IT and Enterprise IT. 
Function IT is the kind of IT that supports in the execution of a task. From a governance perspective, 
this type of IT is not very relevant, as long as it is dependable enough. Network IT is IT that supports 
collaboration, within or outside the company, such as email. Enterprise IT is IT that supports, and 
possibly coincides with, business processes.  
Critical in this development is network IT: i.e. IT applications that enable users to share information, 
work together across borders, co-develop products, and off-shore and outsource business processes. 
All forms of knowledge transfer are directly affected by network driven IT in which it is not always 
clear who is the owner of what and related to that, who can control what. The platform, the 
software, the applications of the software, the exchange of information and the knowledge creation 
is in the hands of many. In this way Network IT may affect Enterprise IT. From a governance 
perspective, Network IT and Enterprise IT both require rethinking. Currently, academics and 
practitioners are struggling with how to create new interdependencies and, related to that, new 
coordinating mechanisms (Elsner 2004). Until now many popular authors focus on success stories, 
using examples based on crowdsourcing (e.g. Linux and Wikipedia) or social media on how 
companies use IT to innovate by co-developing products. There is much less attention, however, for 
the struggles and the failures.  
Network IT on the one hand requires governance to set norms for the use of such IT and on the other 
to determine if and how Network IT can be used to perform tasks. Typically, employees start using 
Network IT such as social media and blogs on their own accord. When left unchecked completely, 
this may lead to undesirable leakage of information and damage to brand perception, for instance. 
Rules stipulating what can and what cannot be communicated will help to mitigate these risks. 
Furthermore, Network IT can be used as a tool to perform company tasks effectively, such as 
knowledge management and company-wide discussions towards developing a new strategy.  
Network governance (Jones et al., 1997) deals with this type of collaborative work. Network 
governance takes input from social network theory and transaction theory to understand the 
mechanisms involved that allow networked communities to achieve results and to safeguard 
information exchanges. Key elements to network governance are social embeddedness (i.e. 
relationships are not just dyadic, but embedded in a network of relationships), informal social 
contracts, and reputation (i.e., some form of social commodity participants in a network seek to 
maximize). An interesting question is whether these three elements can be tailored to “engineer” 
desired performance of a particular social network.  
Enterprise IT performs business processes, i.e. coincides with the way a company is doing business, 
and warrants therefore considerable attention to IT governance.  
Developments in IT and the network economy are also changing the conditions that drive the need 
for and approaches to IT governance. For long, IT governance would be considered as an internal 
governance issue. However, technical and economic opportunities make various IT solutions 
currently an issue of external governance also. For example, technical advancements allow processes 
such as customer relationship management and pay rolling increasingly to be implemented using 
solutions based on cloud computing. This introduces dependence on resources and functionality 
developed and maintained outside the organization. A step further is outsourcing of responsibility for 
executing processes to other organizations, possibly even abroad, to organizations not owned or 
controlled by those companies.  
These examples also illustrate that there exist varying degrees of delegation in Enterprise IT. We 
argue that these varying degrees require also varying governance systems, ranging between agency 
governance and network governance. Certain outsourcing relationships dealing with clearly defined, 
compartmentalized business processes, are very well suited for an agency approach, including formal 
and stable contracts, well-defined tasks and accountable results, and a clear division of labour 
between customer and supplier.  
On the other end of the spectrum, we see outsourcing relationships that are better suited for a 
network governance approach. These are relationships that cannot be captured in formal and stable 
contracts, but, for instance, require investing in social capital to make the relationship work 
(Rottman, 2008) or require a relationship based on collaborative innovation of business process to 
support continuously evolving market demands (Willcocks & Craig, 2009).  
Although this model is focussing on a client-supplier relationship Kraljic’s portfolio purchasing matrix 
(Kraljic, 1983), can shed light on inter-organisational cooperation. Kraljic’s matrix uses the two axes 
supply risk and profit impact. In our adaptation, supply risk is exchanged for specificity. The rationale 
being that the more specific a task is, the fewer potential suppliers there are and the higher the 
supply risk is. Furthermore, specificity is a notion used in the theory on network governance. Profit 
impact is translated into added value to encompass benefits that are not purely financial and do 
require executive attention, thus governance. In Kraljic’s matrix, generic and low value contributions 
are related to commodities. Typically, those can be addressed well by formal contracts and an agency 
governance approach. Contributions that are specific, require substantial investment in a close 
collaboration which is only affordable if the contribution has sufficient added value. It could be 
argued that a task with high specificity, but low in added value should not be outsourced at all. 
  
 
When a situation of high specificity is also characterised by task and demand uncertainty , e.g. typical 
for explorative, innovative processes, Jones stipulates that network governance becomes the 
automatic governance system for dealing with the ensuing interactions. When we use Kraljic’s model 
in assessing inter-organisational cooperation, we could specify the governance mechanisms used by 
studying network theory. This will be done in the next section.  
 
5. Making network governance work  
Literature on the use of social media in an organization (e.g., Li, 2010) or on the evolution in 
offshoring (e.g., Willcocks & Craig, 2009) often state that managers should learn to relinquish control 
and to resort to trust. This is difficult to ask of a manager and also beside the point. Traditionally, 
agency-based governance does not offer total control: it does not guarantee business results, nor 
does it make information leaking or fraud impossible. Managers have learned to trust that the 
mechanisms involved in governance in general merely increase the likelihood of desired outcomes 
and decrease the likelihood of undesired outcomes to acceptable levels. It is the unfamiliarity with 
network governance that makes that “trust” in new mechanisms is not yet sufficiently developed and 
requires an uncomfortable leap of faith. We argue that adopting network governance requires 
learning to extend one’s trust in one governance system with trust in another governance system. 
This becomes easier when one understands the mechanisms involved in network governance 
systems.  
Jones et al. (2009) identify a number of reasons for networks to come into existence. These reasons 
lead, under certain conditions, to some kind of social structure, social embeddedness, in which four 
social mechanisms underpin the, so called, ‘network governance system’ (see Table 3) 
 
   
Participants in a network endeavour seek to optimize their reputation, interacting according to 
norms that may be implicit, but are well accepted within the network community and that define the 
culture within the community. Access restriction and collective sanctions offer means for the 
network community to reward or sanction individuals which increases or decreases the individual’s 
reputation.  
The notion of ‘reputation’ may appear fairly soft from a business perspective. However, reputation 
has direct consequences for an individual’s opportunities to participate in future business 
endeavours and provides, thus, a firm incentive to contribute constructively to business objectives. 
Reputation even may provide a stronger incentive in certain situations than traditional methods for 
rewarding and sanctioning employees in an agency setting. Therefore, trust in the effectiveness of a 
network governance system is – in the right circumstances – not that much of a ‘leap of faith’.  
Ibrahim and Robbers (2009) have introduced the two notions competence trust and openness trust. 
These notions help to understand better the concept of trust in a network governance system. 
Competence trust denotes the level of confidence one needs to have in the competences of, in this 
case, a supplier. Outsourced tasks that require only low competence trust are those tasks that are 
common and not very well developed.  
Openness trust denotes the level of confidence that a counterpart will handle information relevant 
to the relationship with transparency and equity. Having openness trust in a partner means on the 
one hand trust that information is not shared outside the relationship and on the other hand trust 
that a partner is open and transparent to the partner with respect to information relevant to the 
collaboration and the relationship. Openness trust supports intensified collaboration and innovation. 
When only competence trust is critical, and the awareness of the needed competences is very 
critical, hierarchy and contracts will be the main governance mechanisms. When competences are 
important but it is not well known which competences are necessary, a certain level of openness is 
critical. 
Network governance appears better suited for tasks with high competence trust and high openness 
trust requirements. Such tasks require partners with established, but rare competences that 
contribute in an open, explorative style on the development of systems and processes. Thus, the 
notions of competence trust and openness trust can be used to answer the question whether either 
an agency governance system or a network governance system is more suited for handling the 
relationship with suppliers or partners (see Figure 2).  
    
Another question one can ask oneself is which type of activities need to be done within the hierarchy 
of the company and which type of activities can be sourced reliably outside the company. 
Competence trust and openness trust also provide some inside for this. We illustrate this via the 
example of publishing a newspaper.  
The assumption is that a newspaper’s competitive edge is based on the quality of its editors and its 
columnists. Both good editors and distinguishing columnists are rather rare. This implies that there 
should be high competence trust in the abilities of both the editors and the columnists. There is a 
difference regarding openness trust between editors and columnists. Columnists derive much of 
their value for the newspaper from their role in the outside world and are supposed to interact quite 
freely with parties outside the newspaper. Therefore, the need for openness trust in this case should 
be low. Resorting to agency style contracts, requiring exclusiveness, can be used to mitigate the risks 
associated with a lack of openness trust. Openness trust regarding editors, however, needs to be 
high to guarantee the identity and competitive edge of the newspaper.  
Other activities such as printing and distribution are more common and therefore lower on the 
competence trust scale than editors and columnists. Printing and distribution are both commodity 
type activities that require less competence trust (which does not mean that these activities 
shouldn’t be executed dependably). But printing does require a higher level of openness trust than 
distribution. When a paper is being printed, the contents are still confidential. Once the paper is 
being distributed, the openness trust is need for gone. 
The four roles of columnist, editor, printer, and distributor can be placed in a trust matrix as 
illustrated in Figure 3. The activities in the lower left corner (low in both competence trust and 
openness trust) can most easily be sourced from outside the company and can be governed 
according to an agency style (as shown in Figure 2). Activities in the top right-hand corner, however, 
require, when sourced, a network governance approach. 
  
A tendency would be to organise business activities that require high competence trust and high 
openness trust within the hierarchy of the company. However, there will be situations where this is 
not feasible, as suggested by the drivers of network governance as illustrated in Table 3. When tasks 
are characterised by human asset specificity and task uncertainty, there is a need for high 
competence trust. These are situations where activities require certain competences which are 
difficult to assess by managers or where the outcomes of the activities are so uncertain, that 
hierarchical management styles and contractual relationships will not lead to the needed outcomes. 
Furthermore, when tasks are characterised by demand uncertainty as well as a frequent recurrence 
of tasks, there is a high dependence on these resources while keeping the required resources 
standby permanently might be too costly. In such situations a company may decide to bring in 
certain specialists – that are known by the management – from outside the company to do these 
complex tasks, or to bring a problem into the outside world because it needs specialists that are not 
directly known. In such situations, openness trust becomes an issue.  
Network IT facilitates the type of intra- and inter-organisational collaboration of a network 
governance system. There exist now social media platforms, both internal to an organisation (e.g. 
Yammer) and external. The advent of such platforms within companies has in many cases been ad 
hoc and unregulated. But sooner or later the question should arise whether Network IT and the 
network governance system it supports be turned into an purposeful instrument for performing 
business activities. Analogous to the discussion so far in this section, it would follow that those 
activities that are characterised by human asset specificity, task uncertainty, demand uncertainty and 
frequency are prime candidates for such an approach. An example of such a task is the formulation 
of a new strategic plan, or the development of a new product idea. By using the notions of 
competence trust and openness trust one can assess the suitability of a Network IT approach to any 
given task.  
Based on our matrices, decision makers can decide how much competence trust and openness trust 
is necessary and what kind of governance measures are necessary. This can lead to actions and 
policies. When trust is necessary, the differentiation between openness trust and competence trust 
makes it possible to focus in decision making by asking the question: Am I able to approach the right 
people (could make competence trust necessary, if competences are not inside the company) and 
am I able to figure out what the solution should be (openness trust, if solutions, products are not 
inside the company)? Also, it makes clear what are critical items of network governance, so on which 
features managers/entrepreneurs should develop policies in a non-hierarchical context. Accessibility, 
cultural items, sanctions and reputational mechanisms should be developed together with the 
network partners. In these processes, these mechanisms are not only developed in formal 
arrangements but, more important they come into existence in cooperating, in developing 
something else. This is the real challenge of network governance. You do not develop a contract 
together, sign the contract and start. In network governance cooperation develops and as far as 
contracts exist, they are often implicit and developing. Only at certain stages within the process, 
contracts need to be made explicit.  
 
Concluding remarks  
We described when Network-IT (e.g. social media) enable opportunities for companies and when 
trust in openness and competences is necessary and when not. Precondition is that companies 
should know their core competences. Also we have assessed when network governance is needed 
and which mechanisms are relevant.  
We have described changing practises in current economies, leading to the growing importance of 
networks in the development of companies. Emerging new IT-technologies lead to changing practices 
on markets. Outsourcing, crowdsourcing and open innovation lead to new corporate arena’s. For 
management it is often difficult to detect fads and business opportunities. Also it is difficult to 
understand what new forms of inter-organizational cooperation asks from management: When does 
governance need to change within IT and when is it possible to keep existing hierarchical structures 
in place?  
Companies such as Apple seem to know when they have to act according to traditional business 
patterns, when to use hierarchy as critical governance mechanism and when more open-sourced 
approaches to governance need to be used. The company creates an environment in which trust can 
become the critical control measure, for example in developing new apps, when on other moments it 
uses traditional control modes and is focussing on contractual relationships, for example in 
production.  
We have demonstrated that trust and openness are critical in some situations, where on other 
product segments and on other moments in the lifecycle of a product, traditional approaches should 
e followed. This theoretical model could help practitioners to develop a strategy towards emerging 
business practices. Especially the conditions for network governance developed by Jones et. al (1997) 
seem to be helpful in this respect.  
Researchers could draw on our model, when understanding why companies take a certain approach 
towards new practices such as open innovation and outsourcing. Why are some companies more 
innovative in certain markets than others. Why is Microsoft very hierarchical and why do big 
companies team up with smaller companies.  
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